Chickamauga to Dalton, Ga.
VI. Bloody Victory at Chickamauga
Over the next few days, the opposing armies closed in on one another. By Saturday, September 19th, the two armies collided at Chickamauga, Georgia. Saturday the 19th was a full day of combat for a good portion of the Army of Tennessee. Deas' Brigade was placed in line of battle on Saturday morning near Lee and Gordon's Mill, on the southern end of the Confederate line. All around, especially to the north, the roar of heavy battle was heard, but no orders were issued to the brigade. The men remained in a line of battle, waiting for the inevitable order to advance. When the sun began to set, the brigade was surprised to receive orders to fall out of position and take up a new position some two miles further southwest. All of the battle sounds seemed to be concentrated to the north - why would orders be received to march to a new position, directly opposite of the action? Could the army be retreating?
The men of the brigade formed a line of log breastworks at their new position late on Saturday evening. Wounded soldiers from the initial clash of the armies were scattered about the area. Sgt. James recorded in his diary that the men slept that evening with "the dead and wounded all around". On the next morning, the men of the 39th woke up to a relatively quiet morning. Birds could be heard singing in the trees, and the battle appeared to have either been lost or won. Perhaps the 39th would not be involved in the action on this day - like at Perryville, when the men were never brought into the fray. Mulling this over, the men of the 39th ate a quick breakfast. Suddenly, cannon shells began to rain on the men from the west. Several men in the 19th Alabama, within a few hundred feet of Louis Frazier and his comrades, were struck and killed or wounded by deadly cannon shells and canister1.
At 10:00 am, Colonel Clark shouted at the company captains to form companies. Deas' men were arrayed in a regimental front formation. Suddenly, the men saw a cluster of horses generating dust as they approached along a dirt road nearby. The men were honored with the presence of one of the army's commanders, General James Longstreet, and his staff. General Longstreet had just recently arrived by rail with several thousand reinforcements from Lee's army in Virginia, and had been assigned to command the wing of the army that contained Deas' Brigade. Longstreet tipped his hat to Brigadier General Zack Deas. General Deas introduced his Alabama brigade to the General, offered his complements, and assured the commander that his men were ready. General Longstreet pointed toward the woods to the west of the men, and told the Alabamians that the enemy were 'somewhere in there'. General Longstreet authorized General Deas to lead his men into the woods immediately, and, spurring his horse, Longstreet sped away to issue orders to the next brigade in line. At 11:20 am on that bright Sunday morning, General Deas ordered the men forward, and with a surge, the men of the 39th marched into the dark understory ahead.
Ordinarily, a brigade marching into an attack will spread a thin line of men in front of their main body. These soldiers are referred to as skirmishers. These men perform the act of 'feeling' ahead of the main brigade. If the enemy were known to be ahead of the men, but unknown as to where and how many, the skirmishers could approach carefully to the enemy, and by carefully engaging the enemy in light firing, the skirmishers could learn the strengths of the enemy, and report the information back to the brigade commander. By using skirmishers, a brigade reduces the chance that they will be attacked suddenly and subjected to an initial violent blow, which could drive the men into disorder.
On this particular morning, General Deas elected to advance his men without skirmishers. The attack, as planned by the commanding generals, was to utilize a large force of infantry and perform a sudden, terrific blow upon the federal army. General Deas' men were included in this sudden rush of men. In order to heighten the effect of surprise, General Deas, it can be assumed, preferred to have his men thrust upon the enemy so quickly and suddenly, that the shock of the impact would rout the federals from their position.
The 39th Alabama Infantry shouldered 310 rifles on this Sunday morning. The Barbour Blues probably had 25 to 35 men, with a complement of five to seven officers. The men of the 39th advanced up a heavily wooded slope. Suddenly, the Alabamians ran into a federal skirmish line of midwesterners under the command of General William B. Carlin. The skirmishers had been carefully tucked away in the woods, when the confederates burst from the underbrush directly in their front. The skirmishers bolted to the rear, and the men of the 39th began to charge, right on the heels of the Illinoisians and Indianians. Within a few moments, the yanks reached their main line and hurled themselves over the log breastworks for safety. The Illinoisians behind the log breastworks, the 38th Illinois Infantry, opened a volley in the face of the 39th. The Alabamians wavered for a moment, but then the 22nd and the 26th-50th began to edge the federals out of their breastworks. The commander of the 38th Illinois, Lt. Col. Daniel Gilmer, was hit with a mortal wound, and almost immediately, seventy-five men of the 38th Illinois threw their weapons down and raised their arms in surrender, while the remainder of the federals fled to the rear in disorder.
Next in line with the 38th Illinois was the 21st Illinois. The commander of the 21st Illinois, Colonel John Alexander, rose in front of his men and gallantly urged the men to pour lead into the 39th Alabama. A bullet knocked Col. Alexander to the earth, and one-half of the men surrendered without a fight. A soldier in the 26th-50th remembers the 21st Illinois as "being so cowardly that they did not shoot as we advanced on them, but stuck their heads behind logs and waited for us to pass them [before surrendering]. It was the quickest and prettiest fight I ever saw".
But the fight was not over. Another federal line was waiting, the 81st Indiana, drawn up behind log breastworks and ready for Deas' men. The commander of the 81st Indiana watched in horror as the two regiments in his front melted away. Behind the retreating federals was a solid line of gray and brown uniformed men, firing and advancing like an unstoppable machine. Major James Calloway had just been promoted to interim command of the 81st Indiana. Major Calloway looked around him for other federal support, but a shiver ran up his back as he realized that he was all alone, unsupported by any other troops. Seeing the wave of rebel troops surging toward his men, Major Calloway shouted at his men to abandon the position and retreat 'as best they could'.
Out of sight of the 81st Indiana was the recently-recruited 101st Ohio Infantry. The men of the 39th began to pick up their pace. The yanks were retreating as fast as the men could advance! This was not at all like Murfreesboro, when the federals retreated initially but came back and drove the Alabamians back with heavy losses. The 101st Ohio Infantry watched in horror as their comrades in the 81st Indiana raced by them to the rear. Disgracefully, without firing a shot, the raw recruits in the 101st Ohio fled in panic.
Seeing the action from well behind the federal lines, the federal commanders began to sense the disaster that was beginning to unfold. Immediately, the federal command issued orders for a fresh brigade of troops to enter the fray. The orders to attack were issued to a federal brigade under the command of Colonel Bernard Laibolt. Laibolt's brigade was composed of three veteran regiments that were made up of german-americans, and one newly-recruited regiment of farmers from Illinois. The newly-recruited regiment, the 73rd Illinois, were a peculiar bunch. Their colonel, lieutenant colonel, major, six of their ten captains, and several lieutenants were methodist preachers. Many of the privates were sons of prominent methodist families in Illinois. The regiment became to be known as the "preacher regiment".
The men of the 73rd Illinois were in the front of the federal brigade when they rushed headlong into Deas' Alabamians. Deas' men and the 73rd engaged in a hot fight, and the color bearer of the preacher regiment melted to the ground with a mortal wound.
A sergeant in the preacher regiment watched in horror as his "...friends [fell] dead or wounded all about and near me. Bullets from the muskets of the enemy were puffing up the earth, much like large drops of rain at the beginning of a thundershower puff up the dust upon a dry road". Suddenly, the sergeant was hit in the right leg, and then the left. The sergeant struggled to his feet, only to watch as the preacher regiment collapsed in disorder. The remaining german regiments behind the preachers 'fell like dominoes' as his comrades fought and clawed their way away from the action.
The 44th Illinois, a few hundred feet from Laibolt's men, watched the disintegration of the preacher regiment and the germans. The 44th lifted their rifles and fired a volley into Deas' men, knocking several men to the ground, and killing the color-bearer in the 22nd Alabama. After the volley, the preacher regiment slammed into the 44th in their flight, and the 44th Illinois was swept away by the panic.
By this time, the 22nd and the 26th-50th Alabama, the left end of Deas' line, had pulled ahead of Louis and his comrades in the 39th, and the 19th Alabama. Suddenly, a solid line of federal infantry appeared ahead. Volley after volley poured into Louis and his comrades, and the confederate tidal wave ground to a halt. Another color bearer fell in the 22nd Alabama, and, desperate to continue the charge, the commanding officer of the 22nd Alabama grabbed the colors and shouted at the men to continue. He fell to the ground almost immediately, wrapped in the regimental flag. Then, amidst the dense smoke and confusion, some men in the rear ranks of the 26th-50th fell - from a mis-directed volley from the 39th Alabama in their rear! Gradually, the federals began to assemble a formidable line of infantry to arrest the confederate assault. The 88th Illinois had been the regiment that had initially stopped Louis and his comrades. Now the 36th Illinois fell into line adjacent to the 88th. Within minutes, four solid, veteran federal infantry units were facing Deas' men on the crest of a hill.
Seeing the stalling of Deas' men, the confederate commanders sent another confederate brigade on Deas' left to assist Louis and his comrades. The presence of Anderson's Brigade, under General Patton Anderson, renewed Deas' men's hopes, and with a yell, Deas' men continued to charge up the hill. On the crest of the hill in front, a federal general would fall with a mortal wound. The general, Brigadier General William Lytle, shot with four bullets, would lend his name to the hill at Chickamauga National Military Park. Within moments, the federal line collapsed, and the rout of this portion of the federal army was nearly complete.
Louis and his men, shot to pieces, exhausted, and strapped with thirst, were relieved from further action at this point. Anderson's Brigade on the left of Deas' continued the drive westward2.
Geographically speaking, Deas' men fought from east to west from LaFayette Road south of the Brotherton House to Lytle Hill (near the Tan Yard). Today, the area is contained entirely within the Chickamauga National Military Park. A horse trail can be taken off of the main park road to the location where Brig. Gen. Lytle was killed.
During Deas' advance, Sergeant James of Company H felt a sharp pain in his lower leg. Looking down, he noticed with fright that he had been hit with a bullet. Sergeant James fell out of line, and headed away from the battle to find a hospital. A passing cavalryman lifted Sergeant James onto his horse and rode the sergeant to the brigade hospital.
Doctor S. W. Jones of the 39th Alabama staff was at the brigade hospital. Soon, Private Thomas DeShaver of Company H was brought in the hospital on a stretcher; shot through the leg as well. Sergeant James, Private DeShaver, and Dr. Jones made light of the situation, and Sergeant James recalls the three laughing, as Sergeant James insisted that the doctor cut off DeShaver's leg 'right then and there'. The two men were stabilized by the doctor, when a flood of new wounded called the doctor away temporarily. Dr. Jones assured the two men that he would attend to them as soon as possible.
When Dr. Jones returned a few moments later, Sergeant James shook Tom DeShaver to revive him. He couldn't, for DeShaver had lost too much blood and had died. Soon, another comrade, Private Theodore Floyd, arrived at the hospital, shot in the mouth. Private Floyd wasn't so lucky. He 'hanged on' for a couple of days in tremendous agony and pain before he expired.
After the bloodshed of the day was over, the federal army withdrew from the
field. The men of the Army of Tennessee had won an impressive,
hard-fought victory, but had paid a terrible price. Of the 310 infantrymen
that carried a rifle into battle for the 39th that day, 13 were killed during
the assault, and 76 were wounded; eighteen of the killed and wounded being in
Louis's company, Company I. One officer of the 39th was killed
(Lieutenant W. T. Mitchell of Company F), and 6 more were wounded (including
Captain Willis Banks of Company F with a bullet wound in both thighs).
The 39th, in action for a total of roughly thirty minutes, lost nearly a third
of it's number, including
the forgotten heroes, Privates Thomas DeShaver and
Ted Floyd. In other units of Deas' Brigade, the
19th Alabama lost 204 of 469 infantrymen. The 22nd Alabama lost their
Lieutenant Colonel, John Weedon, when he valiantly
tried to urge the men on by grabbing the colors. The 22nd also lost 175
killed and wounded out of their 400 that went into battle. Altogether,
five color bearers of the 22nd were shot down during the assault. The
25th Alabama is recorded as being 'fearfully mutilated', and the 26th-50th lost
about one-fifth of it's 500
men3.
VII. Chattanooga / Missionary Ridge
The federal army retreated in disorder to Chattanooga. The men of the Army of Tennessee pursued, and within a few days, Deas' men were posted along the western foot of Missionary Ridge, east of Chattanooga. The remainder of the Army of Tennessee was posted strategically around the city1.
While in camp in entrenchments along the base of Missionary Ridge, Colonel Whitfield Clark ordered the men of the 39th to fall in. Sergeant Abner Flowers of Company I, along with several others, were ordered to stand in front of the regiment. Colonel Whitfield Clark presented each of the men with nomination to the Roll of Honor for gallantry under fire at the Battle of Murfreesboro on December 30, 18622.
Missionary Ridge is a narrow ridge, rising to a crest with a mildly steep slope on the west face. The men of the 39th spent the month of October and most of November encamped in entrenchments along the foot of this ridge. During these months, the commissary system of the Army of Tennessee failed to adequately provide for the soldiers, and almost all of the soldiers were suffering from malnutrition. Blame has been put upon the commissary general of the armies, Colonel Lucius B. Northrop. Colonel Northrop favored Lee's Virginia army over the Army of Tennessee, and is reported to have favored food shipments out of Atlanta to feed Lee's army first, leaving Bragg's men with whatever was left. Other problems involved the method of cooking and distributing rations. Food was cooked in the rear of Bragg's lines, on the opposite side of the ridge, and delivered to the men at the foot of the ridge. Food was subjected to prolonged delays en route, rough, mountainous roads that would turn into quagmires in rains, and spoilage. Whatever the reasons, the men were required to eat much less than they needed to eat, and, with the coming of cold, wet weather in October, the men suffered immensely. One Tennessee soldier remarked after the war that "Bragg was a good disciplinarian, and if he had cultivated the love and respect of his troops by feeding and clothing them better than they were, the result [regarding the upcoming Battle of Missionary Ridge] would have been different. More depends on a good general than the lives of many privates".
On the 23rd of November, General Hardee, the Corps commander, ordered his brigades along Missionary Ridge (including Deas' Brigade) to be divided. Each brigade would send roughly one-half of their men to a new location along the crest of Missionary Ridge. The remaining men would stay in their position at the foot of the ridge. Brigadier General Deas received Hardee's orders in the morning of the 25th, and immediately protested the command.
General Deas argued that if his men made a stubborn stand at the foot of the ridge and were overpowered, his soldiers would either be "captured or annihilated". He argued that "common sense" dictated the impossibility of an orderly retreat up the side of Missionary Ridge under enemy fire. Furthermore, comrades at the crest could not fire while the 'orderly retreat' was being made, for fear of hitting their own men. Deas' argument was overruled, however, and, reluctantly, Deas sent two of his regiments up the slope, and ordered the 39th to remain in position in their entrenchments at the foot of the ridge3.
The officer that issued the orders to 'split' the men was a renowned officer in the army, and had published a tactical manual for military operations called Hardee's Tactics. His expertise in military warfare is unquestionable, but in this particular military decision, his tactics were to prove to be disastrous.
Compounding the potentially disastrous military formation was the fact that the men at the foot of the ridge were given conflicting orders. Some regiments at the foot were given orders that, in the event of an enemy attack, they were to hold out to the last man and not give up the foot of the ridge. Other men were given orders to fire one volley into an attacking force and then retreat up the slope to the crest. Still others were ordered to evacuate the position immediately upon an enemy attack.
The crest of the ridge near Deas' location was called "Polk's Spur", which is now part of the DeLong Reservation in the Chickamauga-Chattanooga National Military Park. General Manigault's Alabama and South Carolina brigade was just to Deas' left. On the afternoon of November the 25th, the same day that two of Deas' regiments were hauling equipment and supplies up the side of ridge and digging in a new defensive position along the crest of the ridge, the Army of Tennessee was attacked by the federal army.
At 4:00 pm on November 25th, Deas' men watched as the federal army formed in attack formation outside of Chattanooga. Methodically and precisely, the federal army advanced toward the base of the ridge. General Manigault, commanding the brigade to Deas' left, watched as Louis and his men at the base of the ridge "stood firm, and when the enemy arrived within two hundred yards, gave them a volley...but then followed a scene of confusion rarely witnessed....some men were seen scrambling back up the steep ridge, while others continued to fight. Still others knelt dumbfounded in their rifle pits, not knowing what to do".
Realizing that resistance would be futile at the base of ridge, the men of the 39th clawed their way up the steep ridge for three to four hundred yards under a devastating fire in their backs from the advancing federals below. Many men discarded their rifles and accouterments rather than face capture. The fortunate ones that made it to the crest were, in the words of Brig. Gen. Manigault, "..broken down, exhausted, and demoralized".
The enemy, seeing Louis and his comrades fleeing up the slopes, mistakenly thought that all of the army was retreating. The Ohioans and Minnesotans chased after the men. By the time the federals reached the crest, the men of Deas' command were reduced to half strength, as one-half of the men were utterly worn out and exhausted and could do little but try to catch their breath and drink water. Looking to their left, the men of the 39th watched in horror as Manigault's Brigade began to flee from the crest in disorder. Next, friendly artillery were seen being placed near Deas' men - but shockingly being aimed directly toward the brigade, in anticipation of Deas' position being overrun! The 39th managed to fire one ragged volley, then every man fled in complete disorder to the rear. The commander of Company B reported bitterly after the battle that his command had stayed in place "until the entire regiment had left us". One company commander reported that the battle was not a battle, but an 'affair'. The officers of the 39th Alabama were bitter and angry. The strategic blunder of splitting the men on the ridge had led to disaster. The tone of the after-action reports of the line officers in the 39th Alabama would reflect the frustration felt by the soldiers4.
The right wing of the Army of Tennessee, north of Louis and his comrades, had not been placed in the 'split' position, and had repulsed a much larger federal force during the battle. Regardless of their remarkable performance, the entire army was forced to withdraw into Georgia. In hindsight, the defensive positioning of the Army of Tennessee at Missionary Ridge had been poorly conceived and was ultimately disastrous. The men had been poorly clothed and breakdowns in the commissary operations had allowed them to go exceedingly hungry. After nearly destroying a strong federal army at Chickamauga, the Army of Tennessee was driven from the field by the same yanks, due in large part to poor command performance by Bragg and his lieutenants, only two short months later. The men of the Army of Tennessee became utterly demoralized from the debacle, and many men began to desert the army.
The 39th Alabama's losses were light in the engagement, and no soldiers or officers are noted as being killed. Colonel Whitfield Clark, the commander of the 39th since April, and the Captain that had originally recruited Louis Frazier, resigned from the service following this 'affair'. General Braxton Bragg, the confederate commander of the Army of Tennessee since it's conception, submitted his resignation to the President. Interim command of the army was assigned to General William Hardee until a successor could be found. A successor was named by Christmas, 1863. The successor was General Joseph E. Johnston.
On December the 10th, command of the 39th Alabama was officially transferred to Major Colin McSwean following Colonel Whitfield Clark's resignation. Major McSwean, the original captain of Company C, was from Scotland, and had migrated to Barbour County in the 1840s. Major McSwean refused to accept command of the 39th on a permanent basis, and elected to resign from the service. By December the 14th, Captain William C. Clifton, the commander of Company E, was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and given command of the 39th Alabama5.
A muster roll taken of the 39th Alabama Volunteer Infantry on December 14th, 1863, revealed the following:
337 present
291 effective
584 aggregate - present and absent
219 arms [rifles]
57 rounds of ammunition per man
During the Christmas season in 1863, the men of the 39th Alabama Infantry,
after less than two years of service, and after three significant engagements
with the enemy (Murfreesboro in December of '62, Chickamauga in September of
'63, and Missionary Ridge in November of '63), had been reduced to less than 25
percent of their original fighting effectiveness. The men had seen their
colonel shot at Murfreesboro, and felt the pain as the colonel's brother died
from his wounds from the same battle. The men had seen a glorious victory
at Chickamauga, but Private Frazier had witnessed 25 soldiers in his company go
into battle at Chickamauga, only to see seven emerge unscathed. The
hungry, wet, cold, and exhausted men had had to face an enormous federal attacking
force bearing down on them at the foot of a mountain with a steep, rugged,
wooded slope to their backs, with nowhere to go but straight up the steep slope
amid musketry fire from both the front and the rear. Despite all of this,
the regiment still carried 219 muskets, and the majority of the men continued
to do their duty, as the men shouldered their muskets and marched to their next
destination, Dalton, Georgia.
VIII. Days at Dalton
The Army of Tennessee spent the winter of 1863-1864 in Dalton, Georgia. The men of the 39th Alabama learned that a new commander would be taking the reins, a commander from the eastern theater, General Joseph E. Johnston. General Johnston immediately made several changes that were favorably received by the men. He allowed amnesty to all soldiers that had deserted to return to their regiments. No charges of desertion would be brought against them if they returned to duty immediately (the ordinary penalty for desertion was execution). Secondly, he instilled a system of furloughs that allowed each and every man a chance to go home for one month during the winter. Thirdly, he improved the commissary department and the men were able to eat better meals. All in all, the men of the army appreciated Johnston's efforts, and felt that they had a commander that might truly turn things around.
The Army of Tennessee had neglected to pay the men for some time, and most of the men had not been paid since the preceding summer. Johnston improved that situation, and also provided bonuses to the men of $ 50.00. Private Frazier is noted in the State records of receiving back pay for the months of July, August, September, and October of 1863 in December of 1863.
While at Dalton, one man from each company of the 39th was ordered to return home to retrieve a box of clothing for their company. Each of the men returned home, except one man, a married man, from Company C. The married man had decided that he wished to remain at home, and refused to return. A detail from the 39th Alabama was ordered to retrieve the man, and, a few weeks later, the man was returned under guard to Dalton. The entire brigade was marched out to a clearing, where a grave had been dug to house four coffins, for four men to be executed. One of the men was the married man from Company C. The four men were blindfolded and told to sit upon their coffins. The order to fire was issued to a firing squad, and the four men fell backward, into their coffins. The men were sealed into their coffins and buried immediately1.
During the winter, the command of the 39th remained under Lt. Col. William
C. Clifton.
The Atlanta and Tennessee Campaigns - To the Bitter End Footnotes